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By postulating a simple stochastic process for the firm's cash flows in which the drift and the variance
of the process depend on the investment policy of the firm, we develop a theoretical model, determine
the optimal investment policy and, given this policy, calculate the ratio of the current value of the firm
and the current cash flow which we call the "cash flow multiplier''. The main contribution of the paper,
however, is empirical. Using a very extensive data set comprised of more than 13,000 fims over 44
years we examine the determinants of the cash flow multiplier using as explanatory variables macro
and firm specific variables suggested by the theoretical model.  We find strong support for the variables
suggested by the model. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the paper is the formulation of a parsimonious
empirical asset pricing model, based on the fundamental discounted cash flow approach but using
current macroeconomic variables and firm specific variables easily observable for its implementation.
We obtain valuation equations that could potentially form part of a new valuation framework which
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It is a well established idea in Financial Economics that the current value of a rm should be
the discounted expected future cash ows, and that these future cash ows should depend on
the investment policy of the rm. In this paper we give content to this idea by postulating a
simple stochastic process for the rm's cash ows (before investment) in which the drift and
the variance of the process depend on the investment policy of the rm. This framework allows
us to estimate the optimal investment policy and, given this policy, determine the ratio of the
current value of the rm and the current cash ow which we call the "cash ow multiplier".
We develop a valuation model which in its simplest form has only one exogenous state variable
(the risk free short interest rate) and quantitatively shows how the cash ow multiplier is
(negatively) related to the discount rate and (positively related) to optimal investment. We are
then able to show that the cash ow multiplier has two components: the rst part corresponds
to the situation with no (zero) investments and the second to the real option to invest optimally
in the future.
Furthermore, rms in certain industrial sectors require more investment because obsolescence in
the sector is faster, or because the sector is more competitive. In our theoretical model the drift
of the cash ow process (without investments) can proxy for this phenomenon. The smaller (or
more negative) is this drift without investments, the more investment will be required to keep
or increase the level of cash ows. This would imply that, even though the cash ow multiplier
for a give rm is positively related to the proportion of its cash ow invested, the multiplier
should be negatively related to the average investment proportion of the industry to which it
belongs since it would be a more intensive investment industry. We nd evidence of this in the
data.
Using a very extensive data set comprised of more than 13,000 rms over 44 years we exam-
ine the determinants of the cash ow multiplier, using as explanatory variables the variables
suggested by the theoretical model. We nd strong support for the variables suggested by the
model. In the empirical analysis we include four macro variables that aect all rms at a given
point in time and three rm specic variables. The macro variables aect the discount rate and
include the short rate interest rate, the slope of the term structure of interest rates, a credit
spread (spread of BBB bonds over Treasuries) and the volatility of the S&P500 index. Increases
in all of these variables have a positive eect on the discount rate, and therefore should have
a negative eect on the cash ow multiplier. As rm specic variables we include a measure
of liquidity, size and the proportion of cash ows invested. We would expect that more liquid
1rms and larger rms have higher cash ow multipliers. The fraction of cash ow invested is
a variable that comes directly from our theoretical model and should, if investment is optimal,
be positively related to the cash ow multiplier. In addition to these explanatory variables,
in most of the regressions we also include dummy variables to take into account rm and/or
industry xed eects.
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. In a series of papers, Ang and Liu
(2001, 2004, and 2007) address theoretical issues related to our paper. For example, Ang and
Liu (2001) derive a model that relates rm value to accounting data under stochastic interest
rates, heteroskedasticity and adjustments for risk aversion. Ang and Liu (2004) develop a model
that consistently values cash ows with changing riskfree rates, predictable risk premiums, and
conditional betas in the context of a conditional CAPM. Finally, Ang and Liu (2007) show
theoretically that a given dividend process and any of the variables { expected return, return
volatility, and the price-dividend ratio { determines the other two. Although they do not model
investment decisions explicitly, they derive a partial dierential equation for the price-dividend
ratio that is also satised by the cash ow multiplier in our paper given that the corresponding
rm invests optimally.
Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) develop a model that values the rm as the sum of the present
value of its current cash ows and its growth options and is thus similar in spirit to the
theoretical model in our paper. But their main interest is to study the dynamics for conditional
expected returns. In a related paper, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004) derive two
theoretical models that relate endogenous rm investment to expected return. Titman, Wei,
and Xie (2004) document a negative relation between abnormal capital investments and future
stock returns. Similarly, Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) nd in an empirical study over the
time period from 1976 to 1999 that growth in capital expenditures explains returns to portfolios
and the cross section of future stock returns.
Our theoretical ndings concerning the value of a rm's option to invest are related to the real
options literature that started with the papers by Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald
and Siegel (1986). More recently, Grenadier (2002) and Aguerrevere (2009) have shown that in
competitive markets the value of the option to invest can decrease substantially.
Our paper also contributes to an extensive literature on multiples. For instance, Baker and
Ruback (1999) study how to estimate industry multiples and how to choose a measure of nan-
cial performance as a basis of substitutability. They nd that EBITDA is a better single basis
of substitutability than EBIT or revenue. They analyze the valuation properties of a compre-
hensive list of multiples and also examine related issues such as the variation in performance
2across industries and over time. Liu and Thomas (2002) analyze the valuation properties of a
comprehensive list of multiples. They also examine related issues such as the variation in per-
formance across industries and over time. This analysis is extended by Liu and Thomas (2007).
Bhojraj and Ng (2007) examine the relative importance of industry and country membership
in explaining cross-sectional variation in rm multiples. These papers, however, do not include
macroeconomic variables in the analysis.
To summarize, this paper makes contributions in several dimensions. In the theoretical front
we develop a discounted cash ow valuation model that takes into account optimal investment
and how this investment aects future cash ows. Using a data set covering 44 years from 1962
to 2005 and including over 13,000 rms we then regress the cash ow multiplier onto a set of
explanatory variables, which include both macroeconomic variables as well as variables related
to individual rms, and obtain results that are broadly consistent with the theoretical model.
All the explanatory variables related to the discount rate - the short term interest rate, the
slope of the term structure, the spread of BBB bonds over Treasuries, and the volatility of the
S&P500 - have the correct sign and most of them are signicantly negative. The proportion of
cash ow invested is always highly signicant and positive as predicted by the model.
Since the cash ow multiplier is simply the ratio of the current value of the rm and the
current cash ow, perhaps the most interesting contribution of the paper is the formulation
of a parsimonious empirical asset pricing model based on the fundamental discounted cash
ow approach but using current macroeconomic variables and rm specic variables easily
observable for its implementation. We obtain valuation equations using a very large sample of
rms over a very long period of time. These could potentially form part of a new valuation
framework based on discounted cash ows which does not require estimating future expected
cash ows nor risk adjusted discount rates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. Section 3 solves for the
optimal investment and the optimal cash ow multiplier. Section 4 illustrates the implications
of the model taking IBM as an example. Section 5 describes the data used in the empirical
testing and Section 6 presents the results of the panel regressions. Section 7 reports results of
several robustness checks on the basic results. Section 8 provides insights into the value of the
option to invest using the data available. Finally, Section 9 concludes. Some of the proofs and
technical details, including an extension to two state variables, are given in the appendices.
32 Model
We develop a parsimonious model where rm value naturally arises as the present value of the
rm's free cash ows before investments. Investment decisions are made endogenously aecting
the expected growth rate and the volatility of the cash ow stream. The value of the rm is
dened as the net present value of the free cash ows. This implies that the rm value is given
by







0 Ru du(Cs   Is)ds
i
; (2.1)
where C denotes the rm's free cash ows before investments and I = C denotes the dollar
amount of the cash ow that is invested. The variable  stands for the percentage of the cash
ow that the rm invests. The variable x denotes the initial value of a state process X that
captures economic variables that impact the rm value, such as interest rates. The risk-adjusted
discount rate R is assumed to be a function of this state process, i.e. with a slight abuse of
notation R = R(X). For the moment, suppose for simplicity that X is equal to the default-free
short interest rate and that the risk-adjusted discount rate is linear in the short rate, i.e.
R = ' +  r (2.2)
with ' and   being constants. A simple model that would t into this framework is the
following: Suppose that the risk-adjusted discount rate is given by R = r + , where  is the
risk premium and  is the rm's beta that is constant. If the default-free interest rate predicts
the risk premium, then the premium could be linear in the interest rate,  =  + rr; with
constants  and r such that ' =  and   = 1+r in our parametrization (2.2). We assume
the cash ow to follow the dynamics1
dC = C[(;X)dt + (;X)dW]; C(0) = c;
where expected growth rate and volatility,  and , are functions of the state process and the
percentage of the rm's cash ow reinvested. The process W is a Brownian motion. This
specication implies the following result:
Proposition 2.1 (Linearity of Firm Value). Firm value is linear in the cash ow, i.e.
V (c;x) = f(x)c; (2.3)
where f(x) = V (1;x).
1This builds on the ideas of Merton (1974), Due and Lando (2001), and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001),
among others, who use lognormal models in which the rm cannot control for investment.
4Notice that V=c is the rm-value-cash-ow ratio (for short: cash ow multiplier), which is
similar to, but not the same as the price-dividend ratio. In our model, f is equal to the cash
ow multiplier which will be central in our further analysis. One can think of the rm-value-
cash-ow ratio as the multiplier by which the current cash ow is multiplied to obtain the current
rm value. In the literature on the dividend-discount model and its generalization, usually this
multiplier is assumed to be beyond the control of the rm and thus to be exogenously given.
In contrast, we explicitly model the rm's opportunity to change its risk-return tradeo by
allowing the rm to control the expected growth rate and the volatility of the cash ow stream
by its investment policy. To illustrate our approach and unless otherwise stated, we use the
following specication of these parameters
(;x) = 0(x) + 1
p
 + 2; () = 0 + 1
p
 + 2;
where all coecients except for 0 are constants and 0 is a linear function of the state process,
0(x) = 0 + b 0x. The function 0 characterizes the expected growth rate if the rm does not
invest at all ( = 0). If no investment implies that future cash ows decrease, we expect 0
on average to be negative. We also expect 0 to depend on the industry and the environment
in which the rm operates. The parameters 1 and 2 capture the rm's impact on its future
growth rate when the rm invests part of its cash ows. Since the second derivative of the
expected growth rate with respect to  is  1 1:5=4, the coecient 1 captures the curvature
of the growth rate with respect to the rm's investments. If 1 is positive, then the expected
growth rate is concave implying decreasing returns to investment. Finally, to avoid explosion
of the model, 2 is assumed to be negative.2 This implies that there is a point beyond which
additional investments are not benecial any more since the growth rate then decreases in .
Furthermore, we allow the investment decisions to have an impact on the riskiness of the rms
cash ow stream and thus the volatility  can depend on  as well. Clearly, if a rm invests
in a new product, then we would expect this investment to increase both the rm's expected
growth rate, but also the volatility of its cash ow stream. Figure 1 illustrates two possible
forms of the drift when the investment proportion is varied between zero and one. The drift
starts below zero and then increases until it reaches its peak. For the lower curve the peak is
reached around  = 0:7, whereas for the upper curve the peak is reached for some  that is
greater than one. We emphasize that the peak is in general not equal to the optimal expected
growth rate; the rm chooses an expected growth rate that is smaller than the maximum. This
is because investments are not for free, but consume some of the rms cash ows. The actual
2Loosely speaking, this ensures that a transversality condition is satised.
5optimal investment strategy thus depends on the tradeo between additional expected growth
and the fraction of the cash ows that must be spent to achieve this growth. Therefore, the
steepness of the expected growth rate as a function of the investment strategy  is crucial.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3 Solving for the Optimal Cash-Flow Multiplier
The rm's decision problem (2.1) is a dynamic optimization problem that can be solved using
stochastic control methods. This is the rst goal of this section. We assume that the state of
the economy is characterized by the short rate that has Vasicek dynamics3
dr = (   r)dt + dWr; (3.4)
where Wr is a Brownian motion that is correlated with the Brownian motion W that drives
cash ows, i.e. d < W;Wr >= dt with constant correlation . As motivated in the previous
section, the expected growth rate, the volatility of the cash ow stream, and the risk-adjusted
interest rate are assumed to be (;r) = 0 + b 0r+1
p
+2, () = 0 +1
p
+2, and
R = ' +  r. In the Appendix, it is shown that the cash ow multiplier satises the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
0 = max
 f(0 + b 0r + 1
p
 + 2)f + 1      (' +  r)f (3.5)
+(   r)fr + 0:5
2frr + (0 + 1
p
 + 2)frg:
Under the assumption that the Bellman equation is concave in , which follows if 1 > 0, the





2(1   2f   2fr)
2
: (3.6)
First, notice that this optimal strategy does not depend on the second derivative with respect
to the interest rate. Second, it does not depend on the rst derivative if either the correlation
between the cash ow stream and the short rate is zero,  = 0, or if the rm's investment
decision has no impact on the volatility of the cash ow stream, 1 = 2 = 0. To get some
intuition about the optimal investment, assume that we are in one of these two cases. Then
an upper bound on the investment strategy is max = (0:51=2)2, which obtains if the cash
3A generalization to two state variables can be found in the Appendix.
6ow multiplier f goes to innity. On the other hand, if the cash ow multiplier is zero, then
the rm's optimal investment is zero. If investments were free, then the optimal investment
strategy would be equal to the upper bound max. We have however assumed that the rm has
to spend a fraction of its cash ow, , if it chooses to invest. This is the reason why there is a
one present in the denominator of (3.6), which implies that the optimal investment strategy is
smaller than the upper bound,  < max. How close the optimal strategy is to max depends
on the trade o between additional expected growth rate - modeled by 1 and 2 - and the
necessary expenditures to achieve it.
Substituting the optimal investment level back into the Bellman equation (3.5) leads to a
dierential equation for the cash ow multiplier
0 = (b ' + b  r)f + 1 + ( + 0   r)fr + 0:5
2frr +
(1f + 1fr)2
4(1   2f   2fr)
; (3.7)
where b ' = 0 ' and b   = b 0   are constants. The presence of the last ratio in this equation
is crucial. It can be easily shown that this ratio disappears if the rm does not invest. In this















with A and B being deterministic functions of time. The expected value b E[] is taken under
the measure under which the short rate has the dynamics
dr = ( + 0   r)dt + dc W
with c W being a Brownian motion under this measure. If the rm is however investing optimally,
then the last term in (3.7) can be thought of as an additional cash ow that the rm is able
to generate by doing so. From a real option perspective, this fraction can be interpreted as
the rm's option to invest optimally at a particular time t in the future. Brealey, Myers, and
Allen (2010) call this the net present value of growth opportunities. The present value of this
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4(1   2f(rs)   2fr(rs))

ds (3.9)





A(s) B(s)r ds + O(r;f): (3.10)
7We have added a second argument in the denition of O to emphasize that it depends on f.
The rm has a series of options to invest and the net present value of these options is positive,
O  0. Otherwise, the rm would decide to refrain from investing. Clearly, the option value
O is not explicit since it depends on the optimal cash ow multiplier f which is unknown
and a part of the solution.4 Nevertheless, at least the rst part of the representation (3.10) is
explicitly known and equal to the solution without investing.
To gain further insights, let us assume for the moment that the interest rate r is constant. In
this case, it makes sense to simplify notations by setting b 0 = 0, ' =  = const, and   = 1.
This implies that 0 = 0 = const and b '+ b  r = 0 r  = const. The risk-adjusted interest
rate is the sum of the short rate and a risk premium, i.e. R = r +. Furthermore, the optimal















where the transversality condition 0   r    < 0 is assumed to hold. Then we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Cash Flow Multiplier under Constant State Process). If 2
1=4   2(0  






1=4   2(0   r   )

f
2 + (0   r      2)f + 1: (3.12)
Notice that in the special case when the rm has no control over the expected growth rate of
its cash ow stream (1 = 2 = 0), relation (3.12) becomes a linear equation with solution
f = 1=(r +    0). This is a version of the Gordon growth model. Furthermore, due to the
transversality condition, a necessary requirement for the condition of Proposition 3.1 to hold
is 2 < 0.
To make the implications of Proposition 3.1 as clear as possible, let us consider a numerical
example. Similar to the previous section, we choose 0 =  0:03, 1 = 0:1 and 2 =  0:03.
Besides, we assume that r = 0:04 and  = 0:03 such that the risk-adjusted interest rate is
R = 0:07. The positive root of (3.12) which is the cash ow multiplier equals 13.06. If the rm
suboptimally decides not to invest, then the option value in (3.11) is zero and the cash ow
multiplier is 10. Therefore, the option value equals O = 3:06. Put dierently, the opportunity
4From a mathematical point of view, (3.10) is a xed point problem for f.
8to invest increases the cash ow multiplier by 30 percent. Let us consider a second example
where all parameters are the same as in the rst example except for 0 which is assumed to
be -0.05. As discussed in the introduction, one reason for this lower value might be that the
industry requires more investments. The cash ow multiplier resulting from optimal investing
is now 9.91, whereas the cash ow multiplier without investing is 8.33. Therefore, the option
value becomes O = 1:58 or 18% of the optimal cash ow multiplier. This suggests that in an
investment intensive industry the real option to invest loses value both in absolute as well as
in relative terms. In fact, we are able to show that this is in general true.
Theorem 3.2 (Value of the Option to Invest). If, in addition to the assumption of Proposition
3.1, condition 0   r      2 < 0 holds, then the optimal cash ow multiplier f, the option
value O, and the ratio O=f are increasing in 0.
Remark. The requirement 0 r  2 < 0 is a bit stronger than the transversality condition
since 2 < 0. Nevertheless, it is satised for reasonable parametrizations of the model.
Put dierently, the previous theorem says that the option's absolute and relative values decrease
if 0 becomes more negative. This result puts some of the classical results on real options into
perspective and it is related to Grenadier (2002) and Aguerrevere (2009): If the rm is forced
to invest for instance because competitors do the same, then the option to invest loses (part
of) its value. Hence, the cash ow multiplier decreases.
We now study the more general case of stochastic interest rates. Then, the presence of the
fraction in (3.7) turns the dierential equation into a highly nonlinear equation, which makes
solving the equation more challenging.5 Nevertheless, we are able to provide an explicit power
series representation in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 (Optimal Cash Flow Multiplier under Stochastic Interest Rates). The cash ow
















where the coecients a
(n)
i are given by an explicit recursion the can be found in Appendix B.
The main insight of Theorem 3.3 that leads to an explicit recursion for the coecients is to
5At least this is so if there are two state variables since in this case the equation is a non-linear partial
dierential equation, a case treated in the Appendix.











then we also obtain a recursion for the coecients b ai. However, the rst two coecients of this













1 with the algorithm provided in
Appendix B and then apply relation (3.14) to obtain b a0 and b a1. With these starting values one
can then directly compute b ai using the above mentioned algorithm.6 Not surprisingly, in all
our numerical experiments both algorithms lead to the same results.
Furthermore, it is convenient to use an expansion at zero for the volatility  and at the short
rate's mean reversion level =. To see the advantage, we substitute  = 0 and r = = into
the expansion (3.13) to obtain f = a
(0)
0 . Now, recall that this choice is equivalent to assuming
that the short rate is constant and equal to the mean reversion level =. Therefore, as shown
in Appendix B, the coecient a
(0)
0 satises the same quadratic equation (3.12) as the cash
ow multiplier if we assume constant interest rates. Consequently, our expansion (3.13) is an
expansion around the cash ow multiplier for constant interest rates.
4 Numerical Example
In this section, we illustrate the implications of our model by considering one particular rm,
IBM. We study its cash ow multiplier over the time period from 1962 to 2005, where the
relevant information about IBM comes from Compustat. Since this is intended to be an in-
troductory example, we postpone a detailed description of the data for our empirical study to
Section 5. To start with, we choose the parameters of the riskfree short rate process (3.4) to
be  = 0:1,  = 0:015, and  = 0:005. This implies that the mean reversion level is = = 0:05,
which is close to the sample average of the one-month Fama-French riskfree rate as reported by
CRSP. The reason for not formally estimating  and  over the period from 1962 to 2005 is that
there are regime shifts during this period like the spike in 1979 that cannot be well calibrated by
6The algorithm is available from the authors upon request. Since it does not provide additional insights it
is not reported here.
10a one-factor model. We dene rm value as the sum of book value plus the dierence between
market value and book value of equity minus deferred taxes. Free cash ows are dened as
EBIDTA minus taxes.7 For IBM we have 44 observations of the cash ow multiplier observed
on December 31 of the particular year. Figure 2 plots these observations against the realizations
of the Fama-French one-month risk free rate. Obviously, both variables are negatively related.
This gure also depicts the least-square t of our model.8 This calibration is so similar to the
calibration of an exponential model that they are hard to distinguish in the gure.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Given these results, we run a simple OLS regression of the logarithm of the cash ow multiplier
on the riskfree rate. The slope of the tted line is -0.096 and the R2 is about 0.33, which
reects the strong relation between both variables. In the sequel, we will extend this analysis
by running panel regressions and controlling for other explanatory variables. The following
section describes the panel data that we use.
5 Data
Our sample period covers 44 years ranging from 1962 to 2005. The data comes from several
sources. The rst is the combined annual, research, and full coverage 2006 Standard and Poor's
Compustat industrial les. The sample is selected by rst deleting any rm-year observations
with missing data. The only exception is deferred taxes (Compustat Item74) that we set to
zero if it is missing. The reason is that deferred taxes are typically an insignicant part of
rm value compared to the book and market value of the assets (Item6, Item25, Item199, and
Item60) and we would have lost around 10% of the observations if we had deleted them. To
check the robustness of this assumption, we run our benchmark regression (1) that is reported
in Table 4 excluding all observations where deferred taxes are missing. As expected, the results
are virtually unchanged. Furthermore, in our benchmark regressions we have only included a
rm if its scal year ends in December 31. This is by far the largest group. The second largest
group consists of rms with scal year ending in June, but the number of observations is almost
ten times smaller than for the rms with scal year ending in December. The main reason for
initially looking at these rms is that we include a liquidity variable measuring share turnover
7Therefore, rm value is given by Item6 + Item199  Item25 - Item60 - Item74 and free cash ows are given
by Item13 - Item16. Recall that our free cash ows denition excludes investments.
8The calibrated values are ^  =  0:1047, ^   =  1:4735, 1 = 0:0280, 2 =  0:0011, 0 = 1:2400, 2 =
 2:3509, and  =  0:5689 by applying the results of Theorem 3.3.
11that Compustat only reports for the calendar year. We also report regression results where we
include all rms independent of their scal year end (and exclude share turnover) obtaining
very similar results.
In our analysis we use two denitions of cash ow multipliers. In the rst, and conceptually more
appropriate one, we use free cash ow (before investment) dened as the dierence between
EBITDA and taxes (Item13 minus Item16). In the second one we use gross prots (Item12
minus Item41) as a proxy for free cash ows. For the rms with scal year ending in December
we have 113,972 observations for the rst denition and 115,118 observations for the second
denition.
Since our theoretical model and empirical analysis does not allow for negative cash ows, we
need to trim the top and bottom 21% of the data set in the rst case and 7% in the second
case. The reason for including gross prots as a proxy for free cash ows is precisely to avoid
deleting so many observations, and since the correlation between the two cash ow measures is
very high (0.9), we do not expect the dierences to be large. Anyhow, we also run regressions
on subsamples where the cuto quantiles are smaller. In all cases, the results are similar as
we will show in our extensive robustness checks.9 To summarize, after trimming we end up
with unbalanced panels of rms over the period from 1962 to 2005 with 66,102 observations
stemming from 8,043 rms in the rst case and 99,002 observations stemming from 10,949 rms
in the second case. If all rms independent of their scal year are included, we have 119,270
observations stemming from 13,682 rms in the rst case and 177,197 observations stemming
from 17,926 rms in the second case.
The one-month Fama-French riskfree rate was obtained from CRSP. The Treasury yields and
the corporate bond yields are from Global Finance Data. The slope of the Treasury yield curve
is dened as the dierence between the 15y Treasury yield and the riskfree rate. The 15y
Treasury yield is obtained by linearly interpolating between the 10y and 20y yield. We use this
maturity since it can be matched against the industrial BBB 15y corporate bond yields reported
by S&P to calculate the 15y yield spread between corporate bonds and Treasury bonds. Finally,
we calculate the historical volatility of the stock market from the value weighted S&P 500 index
as reported in CRSP. We use the version without dividends, but the volatilities obtained from
the version with dividends are almost identical. Therefore, our results are robust with respect
to this choice. We include the last 250 trading days to compute the volatility. Figure 3 depicts
the sample paths of the four macro variables measured at the last trading day in December
of the particular year. Table 1 presents the corresponding summary statistics. All variables
9See, e.g., Tables 8 and 12.
12are annualized and quoted in percentages. For instance, the average riskfree rate over the
period from 1962 to 2005 was 5.192%. The maximum of 12.528% was reached in 1980 and
the minimum of 0.827% in 2003. There are four years where the slope went negative, namely
1968, 1973, 1980, and 2000. These are times that either fall into an NBER recession period or
are close to such a period. The yield spread reached its maximum of 3.445% in 1990 and its
minimum of 0.415% in 1964. Finally, the average annualized historical volatility is about 14%.
Since a year has about 250 trading days, we multiply the daily volatility by the square root of
250 to obtain the annual volatility.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In the empirical analysis to follow, we regress the logarithm of the cash ow multiplier on several
variables. The rst three are closely related to the term structure and include the riskfree rate,
the slope of the Treasury term structure, and the spread of BBB rated bonds over Treasury
bonds. Holding the other variables xed, an increase in either of these variables increases the
discount rate at which free cash ows are discounted. Since in our model the discount rate
is negatively related with the multiplier, we expect to observe negative relations between the
multiplier and these variables. We also include the historical volatility of the the S&P 500 as an
explanatory variable measuring aggregate equity market risk. We expect to observe a negative
relationship between volatility and the multiplier.
Besides, as the multiplier is a measure of how rms are valued by the market, we also control
for liquidity eects that might aect the valuation of a rm's equity. We proxy liquidity by
the annual share turnover that is dened as the ratio between the number of common stocks
traded in the calendar year (Compustat Item28) and the number of common shared outstanding
(Compustat Item25). The distribution of this ratio is highly skewed with a mean of 12.45 and
a median of 0.37 since there are a few observations with very high turnovers. To correct for
skewness we use the logarithm of turnover in our regressions which leads to almost identical
values of median and mean. In general, a high value of this ratio reects that the corresponding
company's shares are frequently traded. Therefore, it is a measure for the liquidity of the
company's shares. If investors are willing to pay a liquidity premium, then we expect the cash
ow multiplier to be positively related with this variable. Alternatively, this variable could also
capture idiosyncratic events happening to a particular rm in a particular year. To control for
size eects, we include the logarithm of the market capitalization as an explanatory variable.
The market capitalization of a rm is dened as the product of the number of shares outstanding
and the price per share (Compustat Item25 and Item199). Finally, the rst-order condition
(3.6) of our model suggests that the multiplier increases with the proportion of the cash ows
13invested. To test this prediction empirically, we add a proxy for this variable to the set of our
explanatory variables. We measure the investment proportion by the ratio of the annual capital
expenditures (Compustat Item128) over the free cash ows. Table 2 presents the summary
statistics of the rms specic variables and Table 3 summarizes the correlations between all
rm specic and all macro variables. Note that the highest correlation in the table is between
volatility and the BBB spread (0.51); both of them represent some measure of global risk. The
corresponding statistics for the gross prots as a proxy for cash ows will be presented in the
section discussing our robustness checks.
[INSERT TABLES 2, 3 ABOUT HERE]
6 Panel Regression Results
In this section we examine the determinants of the cash ow multiplier by running several
panel regressions that use all the information contained in the time-series. The residuals of
the cross-sectional regressions are likely to be serially correlated. Furthermore, as we will
demonstrate later on, there might be cross-sectional dependance as well. To overcome these
potential problems, we correct our t-statistics using the approach outlined in Driscoll and Kraay
(1998). They assume an error structure that is heteroscedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag,
and possibly correlated between the units.10 The resulting standard errors are heteroscedasticity
consistent as well as robust to very general forms of cross-sectional and temporal dependence.
In our robustness checks, we will discuss this point in more detail.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Our benchmark result (1) is a xed-eects regression presented in Table 4. As postulated
in the previous section, the riskfree rate, the slope of the term structure, and volatility have
signicantly negative impacts on the cash ow multiplier. Additionally, the fraction of the
cash ows invested, , and market capitalization are signicantly positively related with the
multiplier. Interestingly, credit spread is insignicant and the same is true for the turnover
variable, although both have the expected signs. The results for turnover are ambiguous,
though. If we include the stock's turnover instead of the logarithm of turnover in our regression,
then turnover is signicant at all levels and the signicance levels of the other variables are not
aected. This result is driven by about 60 large realizations with turnovers of more than 40
that also cause turnover to be highly skewed.
10In our regressions, the maximum lag is three.
14Given the magnitude of the coecient a one standard deviation positive move in the riskfree
rate (volatity, slope) implies a 6% (3%, 1%) lower cash ow multiplier relative to its mean
value. On the other hand, a one standard deviation positive move in  increases the cash ow
multiplier by 12%. Thus, the eects of these variables are both statistically and economically
signicant.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 report results when we run regressions either with dummies for
the 48 Fama-French industries or with two dummies for regulated, nancial, or public service
rms (one dummy for Fama-French industries 31 and 48 as well as one dummy for Fama-
French industries 44-47). The signicance levels of the signicant coecients remain the same
in both regressions. However, the logarithm of turnover now becomes highly signicant as
well. One explanation for this might be that a xed-eects regression is similar to a regression
with dummies for each rm. Since regressions (2) and (3) aggregate these rm dummies, our
results suggest that turnover may also pick up some of the rms' idiosyncratic eects. In order
to test for the presence of subject-specic xed eects, we performed a robust version of the
Hausman test.11 The null hypothesis of no xed-eects is rejected at all levels suggesting that
there are xed eects in the data. This is the reason why we have chosen regression (1) to be
our benchmark regression. Unless otherwise stated, in the sequel we thus report the results of
xed-eects regressions.
Finally, we consider regressions where we exclude some of the explanatory variables. The results
are reported in Table 5. Regression (4) shows that the spread variable becomes signicant at
the 1% level if volatility is disregarded. On the other hand, the signicance level of volatility
increases to the 1% level if the spread variable is disregarded. This suggests that both variables
measure similar eects. Since volatility is signicant in the benchmark regression (1), whereas
spread is not, volatility has more explanatory power in our sample. This is also documented
by magnitude of the R2s of regressions (4) and (5). Additionally, regressions (6) and (7) report
the results if the logarithm of turnover is excluded. It can be seen that the coecients and
signicance levels of the other variables are not aected.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
7 Robustness Checks
In this section, we report the results of several checks on the basic results. The tests consider
standard errors, endogeneity issues, inclusion of rms with scal year dierent from the calendar
11See, e.g., Wooldridge (2002), p. 288.
15year, and exclusion of rms with few observations. In Subsection 7.1, we go through these points
for our free cash ow denition. We also briey discuss the investment denition that we use.
In Subsection 7.2, we present some empirical evidence when we proxy free cash ows by gross
prots. This allows us to include a much larger sample and to check our results against varying
the cash ow denition.
7.1 Free Cash Flows
We rst compare the standard errors of regression (2) with the standard errors that obtain
if we form clusters by rm and year (regression (8)) or by rm only (regression (9)).12 The
results are reported in Table 6. Notice that the point estimates for the rst two regressions
are exactly the same. Besides, the standard errors are similar leading to the same signicance
levels of the coecients. Clustering by rm only however leads to overly optimistic standard
errors. The same would be true if we run a xed-eects regression clustering by rm only. To
get an idea whether it is appropriate to use Driscoll-Kray errors, we performed Pesaran's test
of cross sectional independence on a subsample of rms with at least 30 observations. This test
rejects independence at all signicance levels, which suggest that Driscoll-Kray standard errors
are more appropriate.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The next issue we consider is the possibility of endogeneity. One may argue, for example,
that high cash ow multipliers may lead to more investment activity. A straightforward way
to address this is to consider the relation between cash-ow multiplier and one-year lagged
investment proportion, . Results from doing so appear in Table 7. It turns out that the
signicance of  is preserved in this alternative specication, even though, understandably,
the point estimate of the coecient declines. The same is true for the logarithm of market
capitalization. Column (13) reports the results if we exclude both variables from the set of
explanatory variables. It can be seen that the estimates of the other variables are hardly
aected. Interestingly, in this case the logarithm of turnover becomes signicant.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
We also run regressions on subsamples with more observations per rm. The reason for this
is that for these rms the number of disregarded observations are much smaller. The results
12See, e.g., Pedersen (2009) and the references therein.
16of the panel regressions when we only include rms that have at least 10, 20, 30 and 40 full
observations are presented in Table 8. It can be seen that the cuto quantiles are decreasing,
whereas the average market capitalization is increasing as we require more observations per rm.
Nevertheless, our main results remain unchanged. The riskfree rate and  are still signicant at
all levels. The only dierences are that slope becomes more signicant for larger rms, whereas
volatility is only signicant at the 10% level in regression (15) and not signicant in regressions
(16) and (17).
Furthermore, our proxy for investments are capital expenditures (Compustat Item128) that do
not include R&D expenses (Compustat Item46). The main reason for using this proxy is that we
would have lost almost 60% of our observations since Item46 is often missing in Compustat. To
check whether including R&D expenses changes our results, we run our benchmark regression
(1) with the ratio of R&D expenses over free cash ows as an additional explanatory variable.
This regression is based on 27,959 observations coming from 3992 rms. Both investment ratios
are highly signicant and have positive coecients. The levels of the other variables are not
aected except for slope which is not signicant any more. However, this cannot be attributed
to the inclusion of the R&D ratio, but to the smaller sample size since slope is also insignicant
when we run the same regression on the subsample without the R&D ratio.
As mentioned earlier most of the rms in our sample have their scal year ending December
31, but there are rms with scal year ending before that date. This may raise some concerns
since our benchmark regression (1) only includes rms with scal year ending in December. To
deal with this issue, Table 9 reports regression results when we include all rms independent
of their scal year. This leads to more than 119,000 observations coming from around 13,700
rms (compared to 66,102 coming from 8,043 rms). In these regressions, we need to exclude
turnover since we have only annual data for this variable. Nevertheless, our results are very
similar to the benchmark regression. Slope is still signicant, albeit at the 10% level only. To
summarize, all the above mentioned regressions conrm that our results are very robust to
dierent specications of the regressions, data and estimation procedures.
[INSERT TABLES 8 and 9 ABOUT HERE]
7.2 Gross Prots
In this subsection, we report the results when we proxy free cash ow by gross prots. Since
gross prots are more likely to be positive, this approach allows us to include more observations
in our sample. It can be justied by the large correlation between free cash ows and gross
17prots, which is about 90%. Running a simple regression of gross prots on free cash ows
leads to a regression coecient of about 1.6 that is signicant at all levels. The R2 of this
regression is 80%. This suggests that gross prots are a good proxy for free cash ows. Tables
10 and 11 present the summary statistics and the correlations for this alternative approach.
From Table 11 note that the sign of the correlation between the cash ow multiplier and the
spread BBBGov changes. This spread is however insignicant in our regressions as long as
Vol250 is included.
[INSERT TABLES and 10 and 11 ABOUT HERE]
To simplify comparisons between the regression results on free cash ows and gross prots, we
use the convention that regressions with respect to the same explanatory variables have the
same numbers. To distinguish both cases, the numbers of the regressions for gross prots have
primes. Column (1') of Table 12 presents the benchmark regression for gross prots. Notice
that this regression is now based on 90,492 observations stemming from 10,197 rms. The
signicance levels of the coecients are very similar to the levels of regression (1). The main
dierence is that, although slope has still a negative sign, it is not signicant. In fact, its p-
value is 19%. Regressions (6') and (7') exhibit similar patterns as before since both spread and
volatility alone are signicant at the 1% level. Besides, column (12') reports the results when
we lag  and the logarithm of market capitalization. Both remain signicant. Interestingly,
the logarithm of turnover is highly signicant, which was not the case in regression (12). This
shows again the ambivalent nature of turnover that we have already discussed before. The same
is true for regression (13') where we disregard  and market capitalization completely. For this
regression, slope is signicant at the 10% level.
Tables 13 and 14 report the results when we either consider subsamples of rms with more
observations or include rms independent of their scal year. Since we now proxy free cash
ows by gross prots, the percentages of disregarded rms in Table 13 are much smaller than
in Table 8 as can be seen from the cuto quantiles that are smaller. The patterns are however
the same. In particular, the relevance of slope increases for bigger rms, whereas volatility
becomes insignicant. Actually, slope is already signicant at the 10% level in regression (14'),
whereas volatility is only borderline signicant at this level in (15').
Finally, the regressions reported in Table 14 rely on the largest sample studied in this paper.
The number of observation is 177,197 coming from 17,929 rms. Nevertheless, our main results
are conrmed.
[INSERT TABLES and 12, 13, 14 ABOUT HERE]
188 Value of the Option to Invest
We have shown that the cash ow multiplier consists of two parts (see, e.g., (3.10)): Whereas
the rst part is exogenous, the second part is endogenous and captures the rm's real option to
invest, the so-called net present value of growth opportunities. Besides, Theorem 3.2 proves that
the option value is decreasing with 0. This parameter equals the expected cash ow growth if
the rm does not invest at all. We expect 0 to be on average smaller when the rm operates in
an industry that is more investment intensive. Investment intensity is measured by the average
fraction of cash ows that is reinvested, i.e. by the average  of a particular industry. To test
this hypothesis, we run regressions where this average is included as an additional explanatory
variable. We have already seen that the cash ow multiplier increases with . Following our
line of argument, the opposite should be true for the mean of the industry. There are two ways
of calculating an industry mean. Firstly, one can calculate the mean over the whole sample
period leading to a constant. Secondly, one can compute the mean for every year of the sample
period, which provides us with 48 time series of means for the 48 Fama-French industries. In the
rst case, it clearly makes no sense to include rm dummies or xed eects since otherwise the
coecients of the average  cannot be identied. But also in the second case dummies would
absorb a lot of the variability that we expect to be captured by the industry means of . For
this reason, we run four pooled regressions without dummies and report the results in Table 15.
Columns (22) and (23) are based on the same set of observations as our benchmark regression
(1), whereas regressions (24) and (25) include all rms independent of their scal year such as
in regression (19). The variable Av pi denotes the average  of the corresponding industry over
the whole sample period of 44 years. In contrast, Av pi annual denotes the average  of the
corresponding industry calculated every year leading to 48 time series. It can be seen that in all
regressions the coecients on the average  are signicantly negative, which supports our line
of argument above. In the last two regressions, volatility is signicant at the 10% level only,
whereas slope is not signicant any more. The signicance levels of the other coecients do
not change. Finally, we compare the results of regression (22) with the results of regression (2)
where we included industry dummies for the Fama-French industries. Figure 4 plots the values
of the dummies that are signicant at a 5% level against the average s of the corresponding
industries, Av pi. The relation is strongly negative showing that the dummies are related to
the investment intensities of the industries. The result does not change when we also include
the dummies that are insignicant.
[INSERT TABLE 15 and FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
199 Conclusion
We develop a simple discounted cash ow valuation model with optimal investment that pro-
vides the basis for an extensive empirical analysis. The dependent variable in the valuation
exercise is the cash ow multiplier, dened as the ratio of current rm value and current cash
ows (before investment). The explanatory variables include macro variables such as interest
rates, credit spreads and equity market volatility, and rm specic variables such as liquidity,
size and the proportion of cash ows reinvested in the rm. In addition we include dummy
variables to take into account rm and/or industry xed eects. The panel regression results
indicate that the explanatory variables have the correct sign and for the most part are highly
signicant. In addition, we perform extensive robustness checks to deal with econometric and
data issues such as dierent estimation of standard errors, endogeneity issues, inclusion of rms
with scal year dierent from calendar year, exclusion of rms with few observations, and dif-
ferent denitions of the cash ow multiplier. In all cases the main results of the analysis stand.
Since the cash ow multiplier depends on observable and relatively easily obtainable variables,
the approach taken in this paper can be considered as an alternative valuation framework.
Even though it is based on a discounted cash ow model it does not require the estimation
of expected future cash ow and an appropriate risk adjusted discount rate. Potentially then,
the approach could be used to value non-traded rms and to determine under and over priced
rms.
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22A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We set Yt = Ct=c such that Y0 = 1 and dY = dC. Then, problem
(2.1) can be rewritten as



















This implies Vc(c;x) = V (1) = const and Vcc(c;x) = 0, which shows that V is linear in c. 2
Proof of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (3.5). The rm value satises the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
0 = max
 f(cVc + c   c   rV + (x)cVx + 0:5
2(x)cVxx + (x)c(;x)Vcxg:
Applying the separation (2.3) yields (3.5). 2
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The equation (3.12) follows from (3.11). By Vieta's formulas, the




1=4   2(0   r   )
:
implying that there exists a unique positive cash ow multiplier if 2
1=4   2(0   r   ) < 0,
i.e. if the parabola dened in (3.12) has a maximum. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We set K = 2
1=4 2(0 r ). By assumption of Proposition 3.1,
K is negative. Due to the transversality condition, this implies that 2 < 0. We interpret (3.12)
as the implicit denition of f as a function of 0. For this reason, we interpret the right-hand
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since, by assumption, 0   r      2 < 0. Next recall that
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(1   2f)2 > 0:
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2. 2
B Series Expansion of Theorem 3.3
We rstly provide a representation of the coecients in the series expansion (3.13) and then
prove Theorem 3.3). We dene b  = =, e ' = b ' + b  b , and
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24and I = f0;1;:::;m   1;mg  f0;1;:::;n   1;ng n f(0;0);(m;n)g is an index set.13
We emphasize that this recursion is explicit and all equations (B.15) do not involve a
(n)
m on the




0 appears on the left- and
right-hand side. This leads to the following quadratic equation.
0 = (0:25
2
1   2e ')(a
(0)
0 )
2 + (e '   2)a
(0)
0 + 1:
For reasonable parametrizations, numerical experiments suggest that this equation has one
positive and one negative root.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We rstly multiply equation (3.7) by 4(1   2f   2fr). Then
we substitute the representation (3.13) into the resulting equation. This leaves us with several





















(r   b )
m
n = 0:
Since the representation of a power series is unique, we conclude that f:::g = 0 for all (n;m) 2
IN0  IN0. This gives a series of equations for the coecients a
(n)
m . Solving these equations
yields (B.15). 2
C Two State Processes
We consider an economy that is driven by two state processes Y and Z that have Vasicek
dynamics
dY = (Y   YY )dt + YdWY;
dZ = (Z   ZZ)dt + ZdWZ:
The cash ow process of the rm is given by
dC = C[(;Y;Z)dt + ()dW]; C(0) = c;
where
(;Y;Z) = 0 + 
Y
0 Y + 
Z
0 Z + b 0Y Z + 1
p
 + 2;







i=0 ::: has two more elements than
P
(i;k)2I :::, namely the elements with
indices (i;k) = (0;0) and (i;k) = (m;n).
25with constants 0, Y
0 , Z
0 , b 0, 1, and 2. The processes W, WY, and WZ are correlated
Brownian motions with the constant correlations Y C, ZC, and Y Z. The rm value reads







0 Ru du(Cs   Is)ds
i
;
where, with a slight abuse of notation, the risk-adjusted discount rate R is of the form
R(Y;Z) = r + r
YY + r
ZZ + b rY Z
with constants r, rY, rZ, and b r. This specication gives us some exibility and allows for
several possible interpretations. For instance, assume that Y is the default-free interest rate.
Then, one could choose R to be of the form
R = Y + ;
where  is the rm's beta and  is the risk premium. If the default-free interest rate predicts
the risk premium, then one can set
 =  + 
YY:
Then Z could model a stochastic beta of the rm. In this case,
R = Y + Z( + 
YY ) = Y + Z + 
YY Z
or in our above notation
r = 0; r
Y = 1; r
Z = ; b r = 
Y:
Alternatively, one could assume the beta of the rm to be constant and identify Z with the
risk premium. Then,
R = Y + Z;
or in our notation above
r = 0; r
Y = 1; r
Z =  = const; b r = 0:





2()cVcc   R(y;z)V + c   c + (Y   Yy)Vy + 0:5
2
YVyy
+(Z   Zz)Vz + 0:5
2
ZVzz + YZY ZVyz + Y()cY CVyc + Z()cZCVzc
o
:
26We conjecture the following form of the rm value





(y;z;)f   R(y;z)f + 1    + (Y   Yy)fy + 0:5
2
Yfyy
+(Z   Zz)fz + 0:5
2
Zfzz + YZY Zfyz + Y()Y Cfy + Z()ZCfz
o
:
Notice that the term involving Vcc drops out since the rm value is linear in the current cash




1f + Y1Y Cfy + Z1ZCfz
2(1   2f   Y2Y Cfy   Z2ZCfz)
2
:
Substituting back into the Bellman equation leads to a non-linear second-order partial dier-
ential equation for f:
0 = ( + Yy + Zz + b yz)f + 1 + (Y + Y0Y C   Yy)fy + 0:5
2
Yfyy (C.16)
+(Z + Z0ZC   Zz)fz + 0:5
2
Zfzz + YZY Zfyz
+0:25
(1f + Y1Y Cfy + Z1ZCfz)2
1   2f   Y2Y Cfy   Z2ZCfz
;
where  = 0   r, Y = Y
0   rY, Z = Z
0   rZ, and b  = b 0   b r. We solve this equation in










This leads to the following result.

















n;m = 1fn=m=0g   2A






n;m = 1fn=m=0g + ( + Yy + Zz + b yz)A
n;m + (Y   Yy)A
n;m





















with the convention that coecients with negative indices are zero.
27Proof. Substituting (C.17) into (C.16) and long calculations yield (C.18). 2
We now expand An;m in terms of the state variables y and z centered at the mean reversion











y   b Y
 
z   b Z
`
:























y   b Y
 
























y   b Y
 
z   b Z
`
To derive this representation, the following lemma rstly provides the expansions of the func-
tions e An;m, Bn;m, and Cn;m.











y   b Y
 












y   b Y
 













y   b Y
 






;` = 1fn;m;;`=0g   2a
n;m
;`   2Y C( + 1)a
n 1;m














;` + 1Y C( + 1)a
n 1;m




 =  + Y b Y + Zb Z + b b Y b Z;
b b
n;m
;` = (Y + b b Z)a
n;m
 1;` + (Z + b b Y)a
n;m
;` 1 + b a
n;m
 1;` 1 + 0Y C( + 1)a
n 1;m
+1;`
+0:5( + 2)( + 1)a
n 2;m
+2;` + 0ZC(` + 1)a
n;m 1
;`+1 + 0:5(` + 2)(` + 1)a
n;m 2
;`+2
+Y Z( + 1)(` + 1)a
n 1;m 1
+1;`+1
141fn;m;;`=0g is one if n = m =  = ` = 0 and zero otherwise.
28Remark. Splitting up b
n;m
;` into a term involving a
n;m
;` and into the term b b
n;m
;` will be useful
later on. This is because b b
n;m
;` involves lower order coecients only that are known when one
calculates a
n;m
;` with the help of a recursion that we will provide below.














y   b Y
 






























Since the representation of a power series is unique, we obtain that for all combinations




We thus obtain the following result.
Proposition C.3 (Recursion for a
N;M






































1fN;M;;`=0g   2Y C( + 1)a
N 1;M








Y C( + 1)a
N 1;M





D;` = (1   2a
0;0














m=0 ::: has two more elements than
P
(n;m)2K :::, namely the elements with
indices (n;m) = (0;0) and (n;m) = (M;N). The same property holds for the index set I accordingly.
29We emphasize that this recursion is explicit. Although the previous proposition is also valid for
a
0;0
;`, we summarize the corresponding results in a separate corollary. In particular, the equation
for a
0;0
0;0 is special because in this case a
0;0
0;0 appears on both sides of equation (C.19). This is the
only equation of the recursion that is non-linear.
Corollary C.4 (Representation of A0;0). The coecient a
0;0






2 + (   2)a
0;0
0;0 + 1: (C.20)



















1f;`=0g + (Y + b b Z)a
0;0
 1;` + (Z + b b Y)a
0;0







and J = f0;1;:::;   1;g  f0;1;:::;`   1;`g n f(0;0);(;`)g is an index set.
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Figure 1: The gure illustrates two dierent forms of the expected growth rate. In both cases,
it is assumed that 0 =  0:03 and 1 = 0:1. For the upper curve, we have 2 =  0:03 and for
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Figure 2: This gure depicts 44 observations of IBM's cash ow multiplier over the period from
1962 to 2005, as a function of risk free rate. It also shows the t of our model and an exponential
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Figure 3: This gure depicts the sample paths of the four macro variables that we use in
our regressions. Riskfree denotes the one-month Fama-French riskfree rate. Slope denotes the
dierence between the 15y yield on Treasury bonds and the riskfree rate. BBBGov denotes
the spread between the 15y yield on BBB corporate bonds and the Treasury bonds. Vol250
denotes the annualized historical volatility of the S&P-500 calculated using index values of the
last 250 trading days. The left y-axis applies to the rst three time series, whereas the right
one applies to the volatility.
33Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median
Riskfree 5.192 2.343 0.827 12.528 4.871
Slope 1.943 1.428 -0.414 5.318 1.871
BBBGov 1.738 0.71 0.415 3.445 1.766
Vol250 13.781 5.366 5.253 31.161 12.727
Table 1: This table provides summary statistics for the macro variables. Riskfree denotes
the one-month Fama-French riskfree rate. Slope denotes the dierence between the 15y yield
on Treasury bonds and the riskfree rate. BBBGov denotes the spread between the 15y yield
on BBB corporate bonds and the Treasury bonds. Vol250 denotes the annualized historical
volatility of the S&P-500 calculated using index values of the last 250 trading days.
34Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median
Ratio 10.933 3.588 2.727 18.956 10.570
Pi 0.675 0.718 -0.749 63.652 0.516
Log turnover -1.095 1.288 -14.453 11.582 -1.001
Log market cap 4.932 2.236 -6.043 12.75 4.857
Table 2: This table provides summary statistics when the cash ow multipliers are calculated
using free cash ows. To shorten notation, ratio stands for cash ow multiplier. Pi denotes
the investment proportion given by the ratio between the annual capital expenditures and the
free cash ows. Log turnover is dened as the logarithm of the ratio between the number of
common stocks traded in the calendar year and the number of common shared outstanding.
Log market cap denotes the logarithm of the market capitalization which is dened as the
product of the number of shares outstanding and the price per share. The statistics are based






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Riskfree -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.023***
(-4.95) (-6.61) (-6.46)
Slope -0.012* -0.007 -0.007
(-2.28) (-1.18) (-1.17)
BBBGov -0.019 -0.011 -0.009
(-1.21) (-0.62) (-0.50)
Vol250 -0.006* -0.006* -0.006*
(-2.18) (-2.19) (-2.17)
Pi 0.123*** 0.071*** 0.038***
(7.10) (7.17) (5.06)
Log turnover 0.007 0.018*** 0.025***
(1.24) (3.30) (4.57)
Log market cap 0.081*** 0.040*** 0.034***
(9.80) (8.75) (7.20)
Intercept 2.141*** 2.405*** 2.392***
(23.17) (47.34) (39.64)
R2 0.1859 0.1783 0.1134
Fixed eects yes no no
FF industry dummies no yes no
Bank-utility dummies no no yes
Table 4: The table reports the results of panel regressions with Driscoll-Kraay errors that
correct for a variety of dependencies including spatial dependencies. The rst regression is a
pooled regression with xed eects. The second one is a pooled regression with dummies for
the 48 Fama-French industries. The third one is a pooled regression with two dummy variables,
one for nancial industry rms (Fama-French industries 44-47) and one for public service rms
(Fama-French industries 31 and 48). All regressions are based on 66102 observations stemming
from 8043 rms. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels correspond
to the following p-values: p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
37(1) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Riskfree -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.025***
(-4.95) (-4.72) (-4.82) (-4.73) (-4.83)
Slope -0.012* -0.013* -0.013* -0.013* -0.013*
(-2.28) (-2.10) (-2.24) (-2.11) (-2.24)
BBBGov -0.019 -0.041** -0.041**
(-1.21) (-2.67) (-2.66)
Vol250 -0.006* -0.007** -0.007**
(-2.18) (-2.73) (-2.69)
Pi 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123***
(-7.10) (-7.07) (-7.15) (-7.09) (7.17)
Log turnover 0.007 0.006 0.006
(-1.24) (-0.97) (-1.21)
Log market cap 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.082***
(-9.80) (-9.67) (-9.70) (-8.34) (8.64)
Intercept 2.141*** 2.097*** 2.120*** 2.083*** 2.104***
(-23.17) (-23.78) (-23.92) (-21.05) (21.78)
R2 0.1859 0.1776 0.1846 0.1773 0.1843
Table 5: The table reports the results of panel regressions when some of the explanatory
variables are excluded. All regressions are xed eects regressions with Driscoll-Kraay errors.
The rst regression corresponds to the rst regression that is reported in Table 4. The reported
R2s are the within R2s of the xed eect regressions. As in Table 4, all regressions are based on
66102 observations stemming from 8043 rms. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The
signicance levels correspond to the following p-values: p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
38(2) (8) (9)
Riskfree -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025***
(-6.61) (-5.99) (-24.37)
Slope -0.007 -0.007 -0.011***
(-1.18) (-1.11) (-9.73)
BBBGov -0.011 -0.011 -0.017***
(-0.62) (-0.59) (-8.31)
Vol250 -0.006* -0.006* -0.006***
(-2.19) (-2.23) (-23.62)
Pi 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.110***
(7.17) (7.38) (6.83)
Log turnover 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.013***
(3.30) (4.54) (7.48)
Log market cap 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.062***
(8.75) (12.83) (39.84)
Intercept 2.405*** 2.405*** 2.322***
(47.34) (37.26) (44.03)
Table 6: The table reports two additional regressions that we run as robustness checks for the
standard errors. The rst regression corresponds to the second regression that is reported in
Table 4. All regression include industry dummies for the 48 Fama-French industries. Panel
regression (2) calculates the standard errors according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Panel
regression (8) computes standard errors by clustering by year and rm (see, e.g., Pedersen
(2009) and the references therein). Panel regression (9) clusters by rm only. As in Table
4 and 5, all regressions are based on 66102 observations stemming from 8043 rms. The t-
statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels correspond to the following p-values:
p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
39(1) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Riskfree -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.027***
(-4.95) (-4.81) (-3.75) (-3.90) (-5.00)
Slope -0.012* -0.010 -0.011 -0.009 -0.012*
(-2.28) (-1.73) (-1.75) (-1.40) (-2.06)
BBBGov -0.019 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.016
(-1.21) (-0.83) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.81)
Vol250 -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* -0.007* -0.006*
(-2.18) (-2.26) (-2.23) (-2.31) (-2.11)
Pi 0.123*** 0.146***
(7.10) (29.24)
Lag pi 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(3.62) (3.47)
Log turnover 0.007 0.014* 0.007 0.010 0.035**
(1.24) (2.17) (1.20) (1.50) (3.04)
Log market cap 0.081*** 0.079***
(9.80) (9.11)
Lag log market cap 0.058*** 0.061***
(5.53) (5.92)
Intercept 2.141*** 2.268*** 2.197*** 2.318*** 2.663***
(23.17) (20.73) (21.16) (20.98) (40.24)
R2 0.1859 0.1675 0.1283 0.1001 0.0634
Table 7: The table reports three additional regressions that address the issue of endogeneity.
We use the one-year lagged logarithm of the market capitalization and/or the one-year lagged
percentage of the cash ow invested. The rst regression corresponds to the rst regression
that is reported in Table 4. All regressions are xed eect regressions with Driscoll-Kraay
errors. Since we are losing one year of observations and because of missing observations,
regression (10) is based on 62048 observations stemming from 7525 rms and regressions (11)
and (12) are based on 61353 observations stemming from 7469 rms. Regression (13) disregards
 and market capitalization. The number of observations is the same as for (1). The t-
statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels correspond to the following p-values:
p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
40(1) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Riskfree -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.062***
(-4.95) (-5.25) (-5.80) (-6.73) (-9.53)
Slope -0.012* -0.015* -0.020** -0.028*** -0.045***
(-2.28) (-2.35) (-2.81) (-3.60) (-4.58)
BBBGov -0.019 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.013
(-1.21) (-1.02) (-0.86) (-0.71) (-0.58)
Vol250 -0.006* -0.006* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(-2.18) (-2.28) (-1.79) (-1.48) (-1.45)
Pi 0.123*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.193*** 0.208***
(7.10) (29.07) (33.46) (30.80) (12.69)
Log turnover 0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.010 -0.011
(1.24) (0.98) (0.74) (-0.86) (-0.76)
Log market cap 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.085*** 0.077***
(9.80) (8.76) (6.68) (6.11) (5.09)
Intercept 2.141*** 2.183*** 2.229*** 2.178*** 2.308***
(23.17) (20.68) (17.79) (15.04) (16.09)
R2 0.1859 0.1988 0.2146 0.2428 0.2893
# ob. included 66102 56520 35023 20493 6686
# rms included 8043 3835 1379 615 166
Cuto quantile 21 14 7 4 2
Av. market cap. 1507.145 1787.128 2550.220 3702.969 7324.377
Table 8: The table reports panel regressions when we only include rms that have at least 0,
10, 20, 30, 40 full observations. We report the quantiles of observations that are disregarded
at the upper and lower tail. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels
correspond to the following p-values: p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
41(18) (19) (20) (21)
Riskfree -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.018***
(-4.37) (-4.03) (-4.04) (-4.38)




Vol250 -0.006* -0.007* -0.007**
(-1.96) (-2.39) (-2.59)
Pi 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130***
(11.43) (11.35) (11.56) (11.49)
Log market cap 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.082***
(9.28) (8.82) (9.19) (8.90)
Intercept 2.142*** 2.098*** 2.121*** 2.079***
(21.32) (21.99) (20.92) (22.16)
R2 0.1744 0.1658 0.1732 0.1700
Table 9: The table reports panel regressions when we include all rms with arbitrary scal years.
This leads to 119270 observations stemming from 13682 rms. The t-statistics are reported in
brackets. The signicance levels correspond to the following p-values: p < 0:05;  p <
0:01;  p < 0:001.
42Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Median
Ratio gp 6.498 5 0.654 25.949 4.900
Pi gp 0.325 0.586 -10.654 28.821 0.150
Log turnover -0.955 1.33 -14.453 11.865 -0.854
Log market cap 4.736 2.317 -11.043 13.073 4.662
Table 10: This table provides summary statistics when the cash ow multipliers are calculated
using gross prots. To emphasize this, the index gp is added. The statistics of the corresponding
rm specic explanatory variables are reported as well. The statistics are based on 99002




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































44(1') (6') (7') (12') (13')
Riskfree -0.021** -0.022** -0.020** -0.025*** -0.027***
(-2.94) (-2.73) (-2.78) (-3.97) (-4.75)
Slope -0.012 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015
(-1.31) (-1.39) (-1.31) (-1.44) (-1.80)
BBBGov -0.022 -0.051** -0.021 -0.023
(-1.13) (-2.81) (-0.88) (-0.91)
Vol250 -0.007* -0.008** -0.008* -0.008*
(-2.36) (-2.86) (-2.54) (-2.39)
Pi gp 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.220***
(10.28) (10.24) (10.33)
Lag pi gp 0.002***
(3.85)
Log turnover 0.001 0.034*** 0.060***
(0.09) (3.89) (4.55)
Log market cap 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.147***
(12.65) (12.75) (12.08)
Lag log market cap 0.085***
(6.46)
Intercept 1.112*** 1.065*** 1.085*** 1.523*** 1.989***
(10.15) (9.63) (9.45) (12.35) (25.84)
R2 0.1898 0.1846 0.1890 0.0836 0.0392
Table 12: The table reports the panel regressions when free cash ows are proxied by gross
prots. The numbers of the regression correspond to the numbers of regressions reported in
Tables 4-7. The regressions (1'), (6'), (7'), and (13') are based on 99002 observations stem-
ming from 10949 rms. Since we are losing one year of observations and because of missing
observations, regression (12') is based on 90492 observations stemming from 10197 rms. The
t-statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels correspond to the following p-values:
p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
45(1') (14') (15') (16') (17')
Riskfree -0.021** -0.026*** -0.036*** -0.047*** -0.066***
(-2.94) (-3.95) (-5.73) (-7.71) (-10.18)
Slope -0.012 -0.016 -0.025** -0.037*** -0.060***
(-1.31) (-1.77) (-3.07) (-4.33) (-5.46)
BBBGov -0.022 -0.022 -0.016 -0.011 -0.016
(-1.13) (-1.07) (-0.75) (-0.53) (-0.66)
Vol250 -0.007* -0.007* -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
(-2.36) (-2.31) (-1.62) (-1.33) (-0.92)
Pi gp 0.220*** 0.268*** 0.329*** 0.369*** 0.480***
(10.28) (11.23) (14.47) (22.55) (13.45)
Log turnover 0.001 0.008 0.014 0.003 -0.013
(0.09) (0.91) (1.27) (0.23) (-0.84)
Log market cap 0.147*** 0.128*** 0.119*** 0.126*** 0.142***
(12.65) (11.21) (9.27) (8.30) (8.05)
Intercept 1.112*** 1.183*** 1.185*** 1.100*** 0.911***
(10.15) (10.44) (9.18) (7.55) (5.44)
R2 0.1898 0.1924 0.2300 0.2890 0.3856
# ob. included 99002 71864 39939 21892 6865
# rms included 10949 4211 1430 617 167
Cuto quantile 7 5 2 1 1
Av. market cap. 1550.778 1824.736 2560.66 3657.959 7228.487
Table 13: The table parallels the results of Table 8 if the cash ow multipliers are calculated
using gross prots. We report the quantile of observations that is disregarded at the upper
and lower tail. Obviously, there are much smaller now, i.e. there are more observations in-
cluded compared to Table 8. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels
correspond to the following p-values: p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
46(18') (19') (20') (21')
Riskfree -0.019* -0.020* -0.018* -0.013*
(-2.40) (-2.30) (-2.18) (-2.22)




Vol250 -0.007* -0.008* -0.008**
(-2.12) (-2.52) (-2.68)
Pi gp 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248*** 0.248***
(14.80) (14.76) (14.86) (14.62)
Log market cap 0.143*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.143***
(13.50) (13.90) (13.47) (12.60)
Intercept 1.056*** 1.009*** 1.028*** 0.973***
(8.35) (8.55) (8.09) (9.07)
R2 0.1839 0.1786 0.1831 0.1811
Table 14: The table reports panel regressions when we include all rms with arbitrary scal
years. Cash ow multipliers are calculated using gross prots. We have 177197 observations
stemming from 17926 rms. The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels
correspond to the following p-values: p < 0:05;  p < 0:01;  p < 0:001.
47(22) (23) (24) (25)
Riskfree -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.013***
(-6.89) (-3.78) (-5.86) (-3.54)
Slope -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(-0.91) (-0.78) (-0.83) (-0.70)
BBBGov -0.007 -0.008 -0.003 -0.006
(-0.39) (-0.43) (-0.16) (-0.36)
Vol250 -0.006* -0.006* -0.004 -0.004
(-2.21) (-2.15) (-1.72) (-1.85)
Pi 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.062*** 0.061***
(7.01) (6.77) (9.24) (9.09)
Log turnover 0.021*** 0.021***
(3.88) (4.15)
Log market cap 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.033***
(7.68) (6.78) (8.75) (7.90)
Av pi -0.338*** -0.308***
(-22.08) (-21.79)
Av pi annual -0.223*** -0.217***
(-10.14) (-11.23)
Intercept 2.575*** 2.481*** 2.518*** 2.452***
(40.61) (37.79) (37.62) (36.97)
R2 0.147 0.127 0.119 0.105
Table 15: The table reports regression results if we include the average s of the Fama-French
industries as additional explanatory variables. These are pooled OLS regressions with Driscoll-
Kraay errros where we neither include xed eects nor Fama-French industry dummies. The
variable Av pi denotes the average  of the corresponding industry over the whole sample
period of 44 years. In contrast, Av pi annual denotes the average  of the corresponding
industry calculated every year, i.e. these are 48 time series. Regressions (22) and (23) are based
upon the same observations as our benchmark regression (1), whereas regressions (24) and (25)
are based upon the same observations as regression (19) that includes all rms independent
of their scal years. Therefore, the last two regression do not include the turnover variable.
The t-statistics are reported in brackets. The signicance levels correspond to the following
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Average Pi of Fama-French Industry
Figure 4: This gure plots the signicant industry dummies of regression (2) against the means
of  for the 48 Fama-French industries. It is based on 66102 observations stemming from 8043
rms.
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